Millions of the world’s poorest people now live in middle-income democracies that, in theory, could use their resources to end extreme poverty. However, citizens in those countries have not succeeded in using the vote to ensure adequate progressive redistribution. Interventions aiming to provide the economically vulnerable with needed resources must go beyond assisting them directly, they must also improve democratic institutions so that vulnerable populations themselves can push their representatives to implement redistributive policies. Here, I review the literature on such interventions and then consider the “democracy catch-22”: How can the poor secure greater democratic influence when the existing democratic playing field is tilted against them?
We explore the implications of judicial learning for trade disputes through a model where both the initiation of disputes and the occurrence of rulings are endogenous, governments bargain “in the shadow of the law,” and the efficiency of the court increases with experience. Judicial learning can explain litigation on the equilibrium path, since going to court today implies future payoff gains for the governments. Our model predicts that where learning is present the likelihood of both disputes and rulings should tend to decrease with court experience. Using detailed data on WTO disputes, we find evidence consistent with significant judicial learning at the WTO, but this learning appears to be article-specific and disputant-specific, rather than general, in scope.
Recent studies find that observational returns to rural-urban migration are near zero in three developing countries. We revisit this result using panel tracking surveys from six countries, finding higher returns on average. We then interpret these returns in a multi-region Roy model with heterogeneity in migration costs. In the model, the observational return to migration confounds the urban premium and the individual benefits of migrants, and is not directly informative about the welfare gain from lowering migration costs. Patterns of regional heterogeneity in returns, and a comparison of experimental to observational returns, are consistent with the model’s predictions.
This paper uses a dataset from Tanzania with information on consumption, income, and income shocks within and across family networks. Crucially and uniquely, it also contains data on the degree of information existing between each pair of households within family networks. We use these data to construct a novel measure of the quality of information both at the level of household pairs and at the level of the network. We also note that the individual level measures can be interpreted as measures of network centrality. We study risk sharing within these networks and explore whether the rejection of perfect risk sharing that we observe can be related to our measures of information quality. We show that households within family networks with better information are less vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks. Furthermore, we show that more central households within networks are less vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks. These results have important implications for the characterisation of the empirical failure of the perfect risk-sharing hypothesis and point to the importance of information frictions.
The frictions that restrict migration are among the largest sources of inefficiency in the global economy. The first step in designing policies to address these frictions is to understand the fundamental forces that drive migration. However, the Roy model—the workhorse model of migration in economics—does a poor job of explaining many important features of this phenomenon. This limitation can be rectified by adding migrant networks to the Roy model. A rich qualitative literature in the social sciences has documented the role played by social networks in supporting migrants in their new locations. Economists have advanced this literature by identifying and quantifying the contribution of these networks to migration. Although much progress has been made over the past two decades, important gaps in the literature remain: Migrant assimilation has received little theoretical or empirical attention, and a richer characterization of the social interactions that support these networks is needed to tie research on migration to the economic literature on networks.
Substantial research in development economics has highlighted the presence of weak institutions, market failures, and distortions in developing countries. Yet much of the knowledge generated in international trade comes from workhorse models that abstract from these frictions. This review summarizes the recent literature that assesses how these characteristics interact (or may interact) with trade reforms, resulting in different impacts in developing countries relative to what we would expect in developed countries. We discuss understudied areas that warrant further research.
We investigate the impact of a large and persistent economic shock on "deaths of despair." We find that areas more exposed to a plausibly exogenous change in international trade policy exhibit relative increases in fatal drug overdoses, specifically among whites. We show that these results are not driven by pre-existing trends in mortality rates, that the estimated relationships are robust to controls for state-level legislation pertaining to opioid availability and health care, and that the impact of the policy change on mortality coincides with a deterioration in labor market conditions and uptake of disability insurance.
Even with comparable innate ability and performance, women may be subject to discrimination. We run a field experiment across 143 Malawian villages in which either men or women were assigned the task of learning about a new agricultural technology, and then communicating it to others to convince them to adopt. Objective measures of these communicators’ knowledge and adoption of the new technology show no gender gap in their ability to acquire, retain and use the information. Yet, micro-data on individual interactions from 6500 farmers show that other farmers are less willing to learn from female communicators, whom they perceive not to be as good at farming as their male counterparts. In spite of this, other farmers learn just as much about the technology when the communicator role is reserved for women, and they experience similar farm yields.
Weak contract enforcement may reduce the efficiency of production in developing countries. I study how contract enforcement affects efficiency in procurement auctions for the largest power projects in India. I gather data on bidding and ex post contract renegotiation and find that the renegotiation of contracts in response to cost shocks is widespread, despite that bidders are allowed to index their bids to future costs like the price of coal. To study heterogeneity in bidding strategies, I construct a new measure of firm connectedness, based on whether a firm has been awarded coal concessions by the Government. Connected firms choose to index less of the value of their bids to coal prices and, through this strategy, expose themselves to cost shocks to induce renegotiation. I use a structural model of bidding in a scoring auction to characterize equilibrium bidding when bidders are heterogeneous both in cost and in the payments they expect after renegotiation. The model estimates show that bidders offer power below cost due to the expected value of later renegotiation. The model is used to simulate bidding and efficiency with strict contract enforcement. Contract enforcement is found to be pro‐competitive. With no renegotiation, equilibrium bids would rise to cover cost, but markups relative to total contract value fall sharply. Production costs decline, due to projects being allocated to lower‐cost bidders over those who expect larger payments in renegotiation.
This paper examines the prices of basic staples in rural Mexico. We document that nonlinear pricing in the form of quantity discounts is common, that quantity discounts are sizable for basic staples, and that the well-known conditional cash transfer program Progresa has significantly increased quantity discounts, although the program, as documented in previous studies, has not affected unit prices on average. To account for these patterns, we propose a model of price discrimination that nests those of Maskin and Riley (1984) and Jullien (2000), in which consumers differ in their tastes and, because of subsistence constraints, in their ability to pay for a good. We show that under mild conditions, a model in which consumers face heterogeneous subsistence or budget constraints is equivalent to one in which consumers have access to heterogeneous outside options. We rely on known results to characterize the equilibrium price schedule, which is nonlinear in quantity.
We study the theoretical properties and counterfactual predictions of a large class of general equilibrium trade and economic geography models. By combining aggregate factor supply and demand functions with market-clearing conditions, we prove that existence, uniqueness, and—given observed trade flows—the counterfactual predictions of any model within this class depend only on the demand and supply elasticities (“gravity constants”). Using a new “model-implied” instrumental variables approach, we estimate these gravity constants and use these estimates to compute the impact of a trade war between the United States and China.
We examine the channels through which a randomized early childhood intervention in Colombia led to significant gains in cognitive and socio-emotional skills among a sample of disadvantaged children aged 12 to 24 months at baseline. We estimate the determinants of parents' material and time investments in these children and evaluate the impact of the treatment on such investments. We then estimate the production functions for cognitive and socio-emotional skills. The effects of the program can be explained by increases in parental investments, emphasizing the importance of parenting interventions at an early age.
We examine empirically the generalizability of internally valid micro-estimates of causal effects in a fixed population over time when that population is subject to aggregate shocks. Using panel data, we show that the returns to investments in agriculture in India and Ghana, small and medium non-farm enterprises in Sri Lanka, and schooling in Indonesia fluctuate significantly across time periods. We show how the returns to these investments interact with specific, measurable, and economically relevant aggregate shocks, focusing on rainfall and price fluctuations. We also obtain lower-bound estimates of confidence intervals of the returns based on estimates of the parameters of the distributions of rainfall shocks in our two agricultural samples. We find that even these lower-bound confidence intervals are substantially wider than those based solely on sampling error that are commonly provided in studies, most of which are based on single-year samples. We also find that cross-sectional variation in rainfall cannot be confidently used to replicate within-population rainfall variability. Based on our findings, we discuss methods for incorporating information on external shocks into evaluations of the returns to policy.